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I. Introduction 
1. Around the world state and local governments have an important and growing role in the 
provision of public infrastructure services.  Subnational governments presently account for an 
average of 63 percent of public fixed capital formation in OECD countries and approximately for 
40 percent in developing countries. However, to date, the subnational dimension of public 
investment has been largely overlooked and it is not as well documented as other local 
responsibilities in service delivery. 
2. In order to contribute to a better understanding of public investment and capital formation 
in multi-tiered governments, this paper reviews the relevant literature and empirically examines 
possible determinants of the quality of infrastructure and quantity of public investment, with 
particular attention to the effect of the overall level of fiscal decentralization.  The following 
questions are explored using cross-sectional and time series analysis: (i) Has decentralization led 
to an increase or decrease of public investment?; (ii) Are more decentralized countries better off 
in terms of stock and quality of infrastructure?; and (iii) What are the factors that shape the 
distribution of public investment across levels of government? In addition, through two short 
cases I further analyze the impact of decentralization on the allocative efficiency of public 
investment and whether it is helping to better identify and meet infrastructure needs. 
3. The results support the expectation that fiscal decentralization is associated with lower 
amounts of fixed capital formation and better quality of public infrastructure.  Estimates are 
provided for two different country samples, one including OECD members and the other 
comprising 58 developing countries.  Comparing the two groups shows that the effects of 
decentralization are greater in developed countries.  This suggests than the positive impact of 
decentralization is contingent on the efficiency of public investment management and overall 
level of institutional quality. The lower levels of public investment may be reflective of 
efficiency gains, but it also raises concerns about potentially insufficient access to financing and 
steady funding sources for subnational governments.  Lower investment rates can also be 
symptomatic of the fact that states and municipalities may be prioritizing other types of social 
investments over infrastructure.   
4. Developing countries are investing more in public infrastructure and are doing so in a 
more decentralized manner than in the previous decade.  After a sharp decline in the mid-1980s, 
the average public gross fixed capital formation increased approximately 2 percentage points of 
GDP between 2001 and 2010.  During that period, Subnational governments contributed 
approximately two fifths of new public capital.  Developing countries are also adding public 
fixed capital at a faster pace than developed countries.  In the 2000s, low and middle income 
countries created on average 3.7 percentage points of GDP more of public infrastructure than 
high income countries.   
5. Levels of capital formation have remained relatively low in OECD countries, possibly 
indicating that most of their infrastructure needs have already been met.  Nonetheless, the  
volume of resources dedicated to capital projects and the share of public investment carried out 
by the second and third tiers of government are significantly higher than those of developing 
countries. Subnational governments in industrialized countries spend on average 9 percentage 
points of total public expenditure more than the rest of the world and are on average responsible 
for 25 percentage points more of the total public fixed capital formation.  In the developed world, 
most local infrastructure services—local and regional roads, urban transit, water and sanitation, 
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and others—are fully decentralized1 and subnational governments are increasingly participating 
in the implementation of bigger infrastructure projects. 
6. Decentralization is in general expected to have positive effects on public performance 
and the efficiency of spending, including public investment.  Ostensibly, it should facilitate the 
participation of citizens in decisions regarding public goods and services made available to them, 
allow governments to better accommodate local preferences and needs, and even generate 
production efficiencies.  In order to achieve such benefits, responsibilities and resources need to 
be given to the level of government that is better able to perform a given activity, while 
accountability mechanisms must be put in place to prevent the capture of public resources by 
local elites and avoid other governance risks.  
7. On the other hand, producing and maintaining infrastructure is a complex task and 
requires a long term planning horizon, sustained commitments for maintenance and operation, 
the mobilization of sizable financial resources, and the coordinated action of actors across 
different government levels.  If institutions are week or incentives misaligned, decentralization 
may exacerbate coordination failures and discourage fiscal discipline and the prioritization in 
public investment.  Poor vertical and horizontal coordination among governments may lead to 
the under or over supply of infrastructure, overlooking potential economies of scales in the 
production of infrastructure, and preventing the full internalization of costs and benefits from 
projects that have spillovers to other regions. 
8. At the same time, devolving infrastructure services also involves distinctive technical and 
assignment issues.  In order to be an effective policy, it needs to be accompanied by sustained 
investments in capacity and the establishment of systems to manage the life cycle of capital 
projects at the local level. In many developing countries, subnational governments may not be as 
well positioned to manage multi-year investments as central agencies. Additional difficulties 
may arise from the heterogeneity of local and regional governments, which typically vary 
significantly in terms of population, revenue base and administrative capacity.  Concurrently, 
subnational governments are subject to regulations passed by the central government on 
infrastructure provision, which may restrict their ability to accommodate for the local 
preferences. 
9. In terms of financing, subnational governments generally face additional challenges in 
accessing resources and managing revenue volatility. The design of the intergovernmental fiscal 
framework affects the spending choices of lower tiers and how much they can effectively 
dedicate to capital investment.  For example, matching capital grants have the potential of 
creating incentives to expand public investment, but other earmarked or general grants may 
result in less than proportional additions to capital spending because resources are fungible.  
Importantly, various revenue-sharing and transfers schemes determine how much of the volatility 
in government revenue would be transmitted to lower tiers.  
10. In particular, the predictability of transfers and revenue sources are important factors 
affecting the decisions of regional and local governments.  Because public investment is a 
discretionary form of spending, it is more sensitive to cuts than recurrent expenditure, such as 
wages and social services, which would generate more concentrated opposition.  Revenue 
volatility will also affect sustainability of capital spending and the proper maintenance of the 
existing capital. 
                                                     
1
 And in some cases, they have been privatized. 
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11. Considering these factors, the paper proceeds as follows.  Section II presents observed 
changes in capital formation and the trends in fiscal decentralization in OECD and developing 
countries.  Section III reviews the theory of assignment concerning infrastructure services and 
earlier empirical analyses of the impact of decentralization on public investment levels. This 
section also states the relevant hypotheses concerning the relationship between decentralization 
and infrastructure outcomes.  Section IV tests several hypotheses using a cross-country panel 
data.  Here also the results from the statistical analysis are presented. In section V, the cases of 
Argentina and Mexico analyze more closely changes in the allocative efficiency of public 
investment as a result of decentralization reforms. The last section presents  the main findings 
and policy implications. 
II. What do we know about public investment in decentralized settings?  
12. In this section  the stylized facts of public investment in relation with the overall level of 
fiscal decentralization are discussed. Despite the many gaps in the available data and the 
limitations in the measurement of both public investment and fiscal decentralization, it is still 
possible to describe the major trends in these areas and identify the most salient issues for how 
they relate to each other. 
Definitions, Data Sources, and Limitations 
13. Before turning to the data, it is important to introduce some of the main concepts used in 
the paper.  There is a key distinction between the level of public investment and the stock of 
fixed capital. On the one hand, public investment or capital spending is a flow measure and refers 
to the outlays made by various levels of government with the aim of adding to their capital. In 
contrast, gross public fixed capital formation measures additions to the stock of capital.
2
  This 
concept refers to addition of capital assets minus depreciation of the existing assets in a given 
period.  
14. There are no consistent estimates on capital outlays that can be used to compare 
countries.  However, both the IMF’s World Economic Outlook database and the World 
Development Indicators offer yearly data on fixed capital formation, total and for the public 
sector.  In this paper, this measure is used as a proxy for the flow of resources.  An important 
caveat is that the gap between capital flows and actual fixed capital formation would be 
determined by the efficiency with which resources are managed.  This gap is likely to be bigger 
for developing countries (Chakraborty and Dabla-Norris, 2009, Pritchett, 2000). Countries with 
more efficient public investment management systems would see greater increases in the overall 
                                                     
2. Fixed assets are tangible or intangible assets produced as outputs from production processes that are used 
repeatedly, or continuously, for more than one year. Gross fixed capital formation, as defined in the 2008 System of 
National Accounts, is measured “by the total value of a producer’s acquisitions, less disposals, of fixed assets during 
the accounting period plus certain specified expenditure on services that adds to the value of nonproduced assets.” 
Public gross fixed capital formation is calculated by subtracting from the overall measure the share accounted for by 
the private sector. This definition excludes consumer durable goods and small and inexpensive tools that perform 
simple operations and the services they generate following the ‘so called’ asset boundary. (For more information see 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/nationalaccount/docs/SNA2008.pdf). 
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stock of infrastructure for the same amount of capital expenditures than countries with poor 
systems.
3
 
15. On the other hand, the stock of public fixed capital and the quality of public infrastructure 
of a given country are a function of past and cumulative investments in infrastructure and in the 
adequate maintenance of existing assets and as such they are outcome measures.  The quality of 
infrastructure not only reflects the fact that there is sufficient  infrastructure, but also provides 
information about its conditions and attributes.   
16. There are several possible proxies for the stock and quality of the public infrastructure.  
Using indicators of coverage of various services—such the percentage of paved road, road 
density, access to water and sanitation, and other similar ones—can provide an overview of how 
countries and localities compare to each other in terms of capital endowments.  Moreover, there 
are several indicators from perception surveys that use a Likert scale to rate satisfaction with the 
quality of infrastructure including, for example, measures for overall quality of infrastructure, 
quality of ports, and quality of logistic and trade infrastructure, such as those provided in the 
World Economic Forum’s Global Competitive Report. These scores are based on the responses 
to the Executive Opinion Survey that polls 94 top level managers in each country from a sample 
of domestic and international (public and private) companies.  While this data is considered 
fairly reliable, comparability over time is limited due to changes in the country coverage and the 
structure of the survey in 2006 (Munck, 2009).
4
  The data should also be considered with caution 
as captures the perceptions of a subset of the population and, like other perception data, may be 
influenced by prevailing or past conditions and events that unduly affect respondents’ views. 
Note also that these measures are not necessarily capturing the spatial distribution of the existing 
infrastructure, and that it is likely to be giving a greater weight to urban centers or areas where  
the polled companies are located. 
17. The measurement of the level of decentralization and how it changes overtime is equally 
problematic. It is common practice in the literature to use data from the International Monetary 
Fund’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS).  The most commonly used  indicator to measure 
fiscal decentralization is the subnational share of public expenditures.  This measure provides 
information on the relative position of local governments within the public sector and how it 
changes over time. However, there is widespread consensus on the fact that this measure only 
offers very partial information on the level of decentralization and effective subnational 
autonomy, which by definition are multifaceted phenomena.  
18. Several potential problems arise from the GFS dataset that may affect the validity of an 
analysis using such indicator.  Firstly, the measure does not provide information on what 
proportion of transfers from national governments to subnational entities are conditional or  
already earmarked for a specific sector.  Secondly, the indicator does not provide a measure of 
the level of autonomy that subnational governments have to determine and raise their revenue 
base (Yilmaz and Ebel 2002).  Such data is available for selected OECD countries and years, but 
it is yet to be compiled for rest of the world. Thirdly, the data does not provide information on 
state-owned enterprises, for example in telecommunications or energy sectors, which could be 
responsible for substantial shares of public investment at the national and subnational level.  
                                                     
3. An efficient public management system is one that translates one unit of spending translated into an equivalent 
unit of economically and socially productive capital stock. 
4. See more details of Gerardo Munck’s commentary on WEF data at http://www.iadb.org/datagov . 
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19. To have a fuller picture of fiscal decentralization, it is necessary to consider not only the 
percentage of subnational expenditure that is locally controlled (Eaton and Schroeder 2010), but 
also whether subnational government have the ability to decide the bases and rates of local taxes 
and to borrow from markets (Ebel and Yilmaz 2002). It is also important to consider how the 
measures of fiscal decentralization intersect with the political and administrative dimensions of 
devolution (Rodden 2004). 
20. The same problems affect the proxy used to assess the vertical distribution of capital 
expenditure that is also drawn from GFS. The subnational share of net fixed public capital 
formation is calculated as the percentage of net capital formation reported by subnational 
governments relative to the total for all levels of government combined. According to the GFS 
2001’s definition, “net acquisition of nonfinancial assets equals gross fixed capital formation less 
consumption of fixed capital plus changes in inventories and transactions in other nonfinancial 
assets.”  
21. Yet, despite the conceptual limitations of the GFS and potential problems related to the 
quality of the primary information collected, this dataset is the only one available that can be 
used to compare, albeit imperfectly, developed and developing countries and assess change 
overtime. Considering these caveats, some of the most relevant trends across regions are 
presented below. 
Trends in Capital Formation and Fiscal Decentralization 
22. The relationship between decentralization and infrastructure service provision is 
complex.  Both sets of variables are correlated with the overall level of institutional and 
economic development.  Developed countries are on average more decentralized than the rest of 
the world. At the same time, these countries have both a greater stock of fixed capital and exhibit 
greater quality of infrastructure. To set the background for a closer examination of this 
relationship, a number of indicators and trends are summarized in this section. 
Fiscal Decentralization 
The trend towards greater decentralization has continued across the world, although at a slower pace than 
in previous decades.  In all regions the average subnational expenditure and revenue shares have 
increased since 1980s.  The only exception is the Middle East that has the lowest levels of fiscal 
decentralization.    
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Table 1 describes the relative position of subnational governments grouped by regions.  In most 
developing countries, subnational expenditures have grown faster than revenues leading to greater vertical 
imbalances across tiers of governments. The comparison shows that OECD countries exhibit the highest 
levels of decentralization. East Europe and Central Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean follow.  
Nonetheless, these estimates hide considerable intra-region variation.   
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Table 1: Decentralization Indicators by Region, 2001-2010 
 
AFR EAP ECA LAC MNA SAR OECD 
Non-
OECD 
Diff. 
OECD/
Non-
OECD 
Subnational Share of Revenue (% 
of Total Revenue) 
14.1 33.7 22.6 23.8 8.2 30.1 30.7 22.2 8.5*** 
Subnational Own Source Revenue 
(% of Subnational Expenditure) 
44.4 71.4 62.1 63.7 80.2 67.9 62.4 60.2 2.2 
Subnational Share of Expenditure 
(% of Total Expenditure) 
23.9 19.0 19.7 19.1 4.5 24.6 28.5 19.2 9.3*** 
Subnational Share of Capital 
Formation (% of Total Cap.Form.) 
28.4 35.0 43.1 34.9 18.9 47.3 63.9 38.4 25.5*** 
Subnational Capital Formation (% 
of Subnational Expenditure) 
23.0 37.2 20.9 27.4 35.0 21.2 8.1 23.8 -15.7*** 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) **   Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)  
Source: IMF’s Government Finance Statistics 2012 and World Bank Indicators 2012. 
 
23. There are substantive and statistically significant differences between industrialized and 
developing countries in the various dimensions of fiscal decentralization and decentralized 
infrastructure service provision.  On average, subnational share of revenue is 8.5 percentage 
points higher for OECD members than for the rest of the world. Also, OECD countries observe a 
subnational share of expenditure that is 9.3 higher than others.  The disparity is even more 
accentuated in terms of the share of net fixed capital formation accounted for by subnational 
governments.  In OECD countries that share is on average 64 percent, which is 25.5 higher than 
for other countries.  Nonetheless, infrastructure additions represent a greater portion of 
subnational expenditure in developing countries. 
Stock and Quality of Infrastructure 
24. There are also considerable disparities between OECD countries and the rest of the world 
in all the indicators related to the existing stock of infrastructure and its quality. Error! 
Reference source not found. summarizes various indicators of access to infrastructure services 
including water and sanitation, road density and pavement, electricity, and telecommunication 
across regions.  Developing countries display consistently lower coverage for the various 
infrastructure services. This gap is likely to widen as a result of the faster pace of urbanization 
observed in developing countries, where the urban population is growing at an average of 2.4 
percent per year.  Nonetheless, Latin America, East Europe and Central Asia, and the Middle 
East stand out for having relatively high percentages of the population with access to electricity, 
water, and sanitation.  
25. In general, the overall quality of infrastructure is positively associated with the level of 
income. OECD and high-income countries have an average score close to the maximum, but the 
mean for developing countries is approximately half of that. East Asia and the Pacific and the 
Middle East and North Africa also have relatively high average scores with 4.8 and 4.4 
respectively.  OECD members and other high-income countries (including several resource-rich 
Middle Eastern countries) appear to be converging. Low and middle income countries have also 
observed improvements and the gap between these two groups is slowly closing.   
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Table 2:  Decentralization and Infrastructure Indicators by Region, 2001-2010 
 AFR EAP ECA LAC MNA SAR OECD Non-
OECD 
Diff. 
OECD
/Non-
OECD 
Overall quality of infrastructure 
(1=low, 7=high) 3.1 4.8 3.5 3.3 4.4 2.9 5.6 3.6 2.0*** 
Quality of port infrastructure, WEF 
(1=low, 7=high) 3.7 4.3 3.6 3.7 4.4 3.5 5.4 3.8 1.6*** 
Quality of trade and transport 
infrastructure (1=low, 7=high) 2.1 2.7 2.5 2.4 2.6 2.1 3.8 2.4 1.4*** 
Access to electricity (% of 
population) 32.6 71.6 N/A 88.4 94.5 50.9 99.7 66.0 
33.7**
* 
Improved sanitation facilities (% of 
population with access) 33.0 66.2 91.8 79.1 83.7 50.7 99.9 64.9 
35.0**
* 
Improved water source (% of 
population with access) 66.3 80.5 94.8 90.9 88.1 82.5 99.9 81.9 
18.0**
* 
Road density (km of road per 100 
sq. km of land area) 25.1 106.1 80.7 50.5 70.5 52.1 268.1 64.4 
203.7*
** 
Roads, paved (% of total roads) 
 32.5 64.7 72.7 31.3 70.5 53.4 81.0 54.5 
26.5**
* 
Fixed broadband Internet 
subscribers (per 100 people) 0.2 4.6 5.9 3.9 1.5 0.4 17.1 2.8 
14.3**
* 
Telephone lines (per 100 people) 
 3.0 15.8 26.4 21.5 14.8 4.3 53.9 14.6 
39.3**
* 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) **   Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)  
Source: World Economic Forum 2012 and World Bank Indicators 2012. 
Public Capital Formation  
26. OECD countries compare favorably to the rest of the world in terms of stock and quality 
of infrastructure as well as in the level of fiscal decentralization.  On the other hand,  developing 
countries are adding capital assets to their inventories at a higher rate. After a sharp decline in the 
1980s, levels of overall gross public fixed capital formation have stabilized or increased in most 
regions (see Figure 1).  Conversely, the OECD and East Asian Pacific regions have observed a 
decrease of 14 percent in their average capital formation when compared to 1990s levels.  
Figure 1: Gross Public Fixed Capital Formation by 
Region (percentage of GDP), 1980-2010 
Figure 2: Gross Public Fixed Capital Formation 
Yearly Change (percentage of GDP), 1990-2010 
  
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database 2012. Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database 2012. 
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27. The recovery of public investment has been especially marked in the Middle East and 
North Africa. As prices of energy commodities, which are the mainstay of their economy, started 
increasing again in the 2000s, the level of gross public fixed capital formation  rose by 13 
percent as compared to the previous decade. As well, Africa saw capital formation increase by 
19 percent during the same period, while East Europe Central Asia and Latin America 
experienced positive but smaller changes, with 7 and 4 percent increases respectively.  
28. Although developing countries are creating more fixed capital as a share of GDP, their 
investments tend to be more volatile than those of developed countries.   The average year-to-
year change, as shown by Figure 2, is considerably higher for non-OECD countries.  High 
volatility can be particularly disruptive for public investment portfolios as public officials are not 
able to forecast revenues and make decisions on multi-year projects. The degree to which this 
aggregate volatility is transmitted to subnational government is, however, a function of the 
design of the inter-governmental fiscal framework.   
Diverging Trends? 
29. A closer examination of the data shows that the relationship between decentralization and 
the quantity and quality of public investment may be going in different directions for OECD and 
the rest of the world. Using a cross-section of observations, Figure 3 to Figure 4Error! 
Reference source not found. display the results across these two groups of countries.   
30. When the data for all countries  is considered together, it is possible to observe a negative 
relationship between fiscal decentralization and the quantity of gross formation of public assets 
(see Figure 3).  Similarly, the data shows a positive relationship between the degree of fiscal 
decentralization and the quality of infrastructure (see Error! Reference source not found.).  
Nevertheless, in the first case, OECD countries fall below the fitted line, whereas in the second 
they fall north of the predicted value for countries with the same degree of fiscal 
decentralization.  This is to be expected they would have a lower ratio of fixed capital formation 
to GDP than developing countries facing significant infrastructure gaps.  
Figure 3: Gross Public Fixed Capital Formation as 
% of GDP and Subnational Expenditure Share, 2009 
Figure 4: Quality of Infrastructure and Subnational 
Expenditure Share, 2009 
  
Source: IMF WEO 2012, WB Decentralization Indicators 2012. Source: WEF 2012, WB Decentralization Indicators 2012. 
Note: Blue diamonds represent OECD countries, grey dots represent developing countries. The dash black (---) line is the fitted 
line for OECD countries and the gray dash dot (-.-.-) line is the fitted line for developing countries. 
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31. Greater decentralization is positively associated with better outcomes in terms of quality 
infrastructure in OECD countries.  However, the sign of the relation between capital expenditure 
and the level of decentralization turns negative for developing countries.  The same difference is 
observed when comparing the relationship between the level of gross public capital formation 
and fiscal decentralization.  
32. This divergence may suggest that the effect of decentralization on the quantity and 
quality of public investment is contingent on the overall quality of institutions.  Institutional 
capacity and the degree to which local governments are accountable to citizens affect their ability 
to use resources and their incentives to respond to local preferences and address infrastructure 
gaps.  On the other hand, if accountability and institutional capacity are weak, decentralization 
can lead to an erosion of infrastructure stocks.  
33. Nevertheless, when using the subnational share of net capital formation as the 
independent variable, a positive relationship is observed between the degree of decentralization 
in capital investment and the quality of infrastructure for both country groups—OECD and non-
OECD.  An important caveat is that there are fewer observations available for that variable and 
countries that report data for subnational governments are likely to be the ones that have a longer 
tradition of decentralization and more established institutions at the subnational level. 
III. Insights from the Literature and Relevant Hypotheses  
34. To help us interpret the emerging data, this section turns to the literature on 
decentralization. Although the empirical research examining the effect of decentralization on 
infrastructure spending and quality is relative limited, it offers some relevant insights that are 
here discussed and tested in the following section.  
35. A central tenant of the first generation of federalism literature is that decentralization 
should contribute to reducing aggregate public spending and taming fiscal pressure.  Brennan 
and Buchanan developed a hypothesis, known in the literature as the ‘Leviathan hypothesis’, that 
states that the “[t]otal government intrusion into the economy should be smaller, ceteris paribus, 
the greater the extent to which taxes and expenditures are decentralized...” (1980: 15).  The 
central mechanism through which the reduction of government size is achieved according to this 
theory is the competition among subnational governments to offer different fiscal packages to 
citizens.
5
  Importantly, this theory assumes that individuals are highly mobile across 
jurisdictions.  Following the logic of the ‘Leviathan hypothesis’, decentralization may be 
expected to reduce all forms of spending, including capital spending. 
36. Estache and Sinha (1994) compare data from a small sample of OECD and developing 
countries to examine how decentralization affects spending in infrastructure.  Contrary to the 
Leviathan hypothesis, they conclude that decentralization tends to increase both total and 
subnational spending on public infrastructure. According to these authors the elasticity of 
infrastructure spending is similar across developed and developing countries. The explanation 
offered in the paper for the increase in capital spending is that subnational governments’ 
preferences  on quality and quantity of infrastructure are different from those of the central 
                                                     
5
 The relationship between fiscal decentralization and public spending has spurred numerous empirical analyses, but 
to date there no consensus on what the outcome is. 
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government. It is important to note that the number of developing countries included in that 
sample is fairly limited in comparison with the ones included in this paper. In other words, local 
governments are thought to put a greater weight in capital spending. Kappeler and Välilä (2008) 
find similar results using a sample of European countries.  
37. A fundamental argument in favor of decentralizing infrastructure is that moving decision-
making and implementation closer to clients yields efficiency gains. These gains can come from 
two sources. First, production efficiency implies that local entities can build and operate a certain 
types infrastructure less expensively. Cost savings may derive from cheaper local building 
materials, less expensive local labor, more efficient project design, fewer layers of bureaucratic 
oversight, and lower corruption, among other sources (Peterson and Muzzini 2005). 
Sustainability is an important aspect of production efficiency. Second, allocative efficiency 
implies that locally identified investment priorities would better reflect citizens’ preferences than 
those determined by the central government.  And, citizens would value each unit of 
infrastructure spending more highly.  
38. Yet there is little agreement on whether these benefits have materialized, as shown by 
two studies including the work of Asthana (2003) on water provision in India and Faguet’s 
(2004, 2008) on per capita infrastructure spending in Bolivia and Colombia that offer opposite 
conclusions.  On the one hand, using state level data, Asthana (2003) finds that state and local of 
public investment in the water sector is less efficient and has higher costs per unit of output.  On 
the other hand, Faguet (2008) compares the impact of decentralization on municipalities’ uses of 
public resources, the distribution of resources across space,  local government responsiveness, 
and poverty-orientation.  The author reports that devolving responsibilities to local governments  
reduces public investment levels and shifts resources to social and human capital spending.  
Nonetheless, Faguet finds evidence that operating costs remain steady and that decentralization 
leads to more responsive and better spatially distributed investments.  
39. How subnational governments make decisions over capital allocation and administer 
infrastructure has only also been thinly studied. The limited literature on the subject highlights 
that greater fiscal autonomy, in particular on the revenue side, fosters competition among 
localities to attract citizens and investors.  Inter-jurisdictional competition may have positive 
effects on the responsiveness of local governments to infrastructure needs and may even lead an 
oversupply of fixed capital assets, especially if actions to improve existing infrastructure are not 
properly coordinated across levels of government (Keen and Marchant 1997).  Yet, if the 
competition for private capital leads to lowering tax rates and revenues, there could be an 
underinvestment in infrastructure (Sinn 2003).  As well, in a similar manner to national level 
public investment, capital spending by subnational governments is expected to be affected by 
year-to-year variation in their fiscal balance and access to financing and their ability to take new 
debt.   
40. The existing literature also warns about the highly pro-cyclical character of subnational 
public investment and about potential disproportional cuts during fiscal downturns.  The more 
dependent subnational governments are on capital grants from the central government, the more 
volatile their capital expenditure envelope will be.  Holtz-Eaking and Schwartz (1995) report that 
in the United States local capital investment allocations are affected by revenue changes and, in 
turn, this leads to pro-cyclical spending.  In Spain, Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2011) 
document a disproportional fall of investment at the subnational level as a result of fiscal 
adjustment.  
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41. Decentralization may not only change the level of investment at the subnational level, but 
also change the composition of the investment portfolio. Kappeler and Välilä (2008) report that, 
in EU members, decentralization has increased infrastructure investments in schools and 
hospitals. As well, there may even be an inverse relationship between infrastructure gaps and 
subnational allocations tocapital projects.  Cai and Treisman (2005) argue that regions that are 
unattractive to investors because of the low quality of their infrastructure would not be able to 
compensate for its initial disadvantage.  As a result, they are more likely  to use public resources 
for other goals that offer greater short term benefits.  
42. From the review of the literature, it is possible to extract several testable hypotheses 
about the relationship between fiscal decentralization and public investment. They are 
synthesized in Table 3.  Four sets of factors are expected to influence public investment in three 
areas, including: (i) the overall quality of infrastructure, (ii) aggregate quantity of public fixed 
capital formation, and, (iii)how much of those additions are accounted for by subnational 
governments.  
Table 3: Summary of Hypotheses 
 
Overall Quality of 
Infrastructure  
Aggregate Quantity Public 
Investment 
Subnational Share of Public 
Investment 
Fiscal Decentralization + - + 
Revenue + - + 
Expenditure + - + 
Vertical Imbalance - + - 
Demand for Infrastructure - + + 
Infrastructure Gaps - + + 
Per Capita Income Growth + + + 
Urbanization - + + 
Population Density - + + 
Economic Context + + + 
Per Capita Income + + + 
Fiscal Space (Balance, Debt) + + + 
Volatility of Capital Spending - - - 
Quality of Institutions  + - + 
Control of Corruption + - + 
Voice and Accountability + - + 
Government Effectiveness + - + 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
43. The first hypothesis is that greater subnational fiscal autonomy is expected to increase the 
efficiency of capital spending, as well as positively impact the quality of created fixed capital 
assets as a result of informational advantages and greater direct accountability enjoyed by 
regional and local governments.  Larger subnational shares of expenditure and own revenue 
should in general be accompanied with more decentralized capital spending. 
44. The second group of variables refers to the magnitude of the demand for infrastructure 
services in a given country. The underlying hypothesis is that the bigger the gap between the 
stock of present capital and unmet needs is, the larger public investment would be, other things 
equal.  Countries experiencing rapid urbanization would more likely have greater demands for 
transport, electricity, sanitation and infrastructure for the new dwellers of large urban centers and 
the settlements and secondary cities that surround them.  Similarly, more densely populated 
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countries would need larger investments than those which are not.  On the other hand, 
developing countries with large infrastructure gaps may resort to decentralization of public 
investment as a policy to tackle the challenge of increasing access to various services.  
Additionally, as the measure infrastructure quality is reflective of how much infrastructure 
services are already available, it is expected that it would be inversely associated with the 
demand for public investment.   
45. A third hypothesis is that better economic conditions would allow for higher rates of 
public investments as they would make capital spending more affordable. The better the fiscal 
position of a country is, the greater the room it would have to invest without compromising fiscal 
sustainability.  Higher income would also increase the likelihood that investments are more 
consistent over time and, consequently, the quality of infrastructure should be greater.  
Additionally, the reviewed data showed that developed countries are more decentralized.   
46. Fourth, the literature suggests that outcomes may be contingent not only on the level of 
economic development, but also on the overall level of institutional capacity and degree of 
accountability.  Decentralization can shift resources from needed infrastructure investments to 
recurrent spending or lead to waste if local governments are “too susceptible to elite capture, and 
too lacking in technical, human and financial resources, to produce a range of public services 
that are varied, efficient and responsive to local demand” (Faguet 2012: 1116).   
IV. Empirical Cross-Sectional Analysis  
47. In this section, I test the validity of the  hypotheses just discussed. Before turning the 
analysis, the data, estimation methodology (pooled time series crosssection analysis), and the 
model specification are presented. Then, I discuss the results linking them to the hypotheses. 
Data 
In section II, the main definitions and limitations considered have been presented. The 
(unbalanced) panel comprises yearly observations from 1990 to 2010 for 87 countries, with a 
total of approximately 1,540 data points. Each observation represents the aggregate national 
measure.  The main sources of data used are the World Bank Decentralization Indicators based 
on the International Monetary Fund’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS), the IMF’s World 
Economic Outlook (WEO) databases, the World Bank Development Indicators, and the World 
Economic Forum.  The unit of analysis used is “country-year” within the framework of a 
multivariate analysis.  A detailed description of the variables, their summary statistics, and the 
sample  are available in the Annex’s Table 7 to Table 10. 
Estimation Methodology and Model Specification 
48. Taking the data’s limitations discussed earlier in the paper into consideration, the analysis 
uses pooled time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) estimation to overcome the degree of freedom 
problem created by the limited number of countries and years examined and to have greater 
variability in the dependent and independent variables. A feasible generalized least squares 
regression is used to correct for potential heteroschesdastic and autocorrelated errors across time 
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and across countries. Using this technique to estimate the effects of decentralization on gross 
fixed capital formation as a ratio of GDP, the score for quality of infrastructure, and the 
subnational share of fixed capital formation are regressed on the indicators of decentralization 
and the variables best capturing each of the hypotheses discussed in the previous section.  
The following multiple regression model is used:       Yit = β0 + ∑ β    k xkit +eit 
49. Where i = 1,2,….; N; refers to a cross-sectional unit; t = 1,2,….; T; refers to a time period 
and k = 1,2,….; K; refers to each specific explanatory variable. Yit and xit refer respectively to 
dependent and independent variables for unit i and time t; and eit is a random error and β0 and βk 
refer, respectively, to the intercept and the slope parameters.  Therefore, a complete model of 
public investment is given by:  
Yit = β0 + β1 Fiscal Decentralization kit + β2 Stock of Infrastructurekit + β3 Economic Conditionsit + β4 
Quality of Institutionskit + kit 
50. First, in order to address the possibility that fiscal decentralization is endogenous, and 
following the literature on the subject (Arzaghi and Henderson 2005, Strumpf and Obersholzer-
Gee 2002, Panizza 1999), the model uses geographical area of countries as a control for fiscal 
decentralization.  As Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007, 2283) explain, “[t]he intuition behind 
this instrument is that, ceteris paribus, costs of centralized governance increase with geographical 
size of the country which leads to higher economic decentralization in countries with larger 
area.”  While geographical area can be endogenous in the long run, it is possible to assume that 
of the size of countries is exogenous when only analyzing the last three decades.  
51. Partial models are used to test the explanatory power of different independent variables 
identified by the literature as relevant and presented in the earlier section.  Some of the variables 
used to test the various hypotheses include urban population growth (to proxy for the demand for 
investment in infrastructure), GDP per capita (to proxy for the purchasing power), cash balance 
and the ratio of debt to GDP of the central government (to proxy fiscal space), ratio of 
government consumption to GDP (to proxy for the size of government), road density per sq. km. 
and access to improved sanitation (to proxy infrastructure stock), and the population density (to 
consider density effects).   
Results 
52. This section discusses the results from the econometric analysis.  Regressions are run for 
the complete set of countries, on the one hand, and separately for the OECD and developing 
countries, on the other hand. The results should be interpreted with caution as some of the 
predictions in the literature hinge on assumptions whose relevance cannot be examined with the 
available data.  
Public Investment Quantity 
53. The results give support to the hypothesis that decentralization lowers the quantity of 
public investment. Table 4 displays the results of FGLS regressions for gross public fixed capital 
formation as a share of GDP.  The estimates for subnational revenue  and subnational 
expenditure shares are negative.  All else equal, a 10 percentage point increase in the share of 
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revenue implemented by the subnational level is associated with a decrease of 1/5 percentage 
point in fixed capital formation ratio to GDP. The coefficient for developing countries is the 
same.  For OECD countries, while the coefficient is smaller, the effect of expenditure 
decentralization is similar with a negative coefficient of 0.02.   
54. While the rate of urbanization, a proxy for the demand for infrastructure, has a positive 
coefficient, a higher share of urban dwellers appears to negatively affect the aggregate level of 
capital formation.  A percentage point of urban population growth is associated with a 0.1 
percentage point decrease in public fixed capital formation, all else equal. The coefficient is for 
OECD countries is 0.3, but it is not statistically significant for the developing country sample. 
55. Population density, which is a measure of e potential for economies of scale, does not 
appear to have a meaningful influence on either aggregate public fixed capital formation or the 
quality of infrastructure.  In contrast, total population and the land area of a country have 
substantive and statistically significant effects, but the sign of their coefficients go in different 
directions. A 1 percentage increase in the number of inhabitants will lead to a decrease of 0.6 
percentage points in gross public fixed capital formation as a share of GDP, whereas a 1 
percentage increase in the total population will increase in the quality of infrastructure.  But, a 1 
percentage point increase in the surface area of a country in square kilometers will lead to an 
increase in capital formation of 0.7 percentage points of GDP, while the same percentage 
increase will lead to a decrease of 0.1 points in the overall quality of infrastructure.  
56. Economic development positvely affects the ratio of gross public fixed capital formation 
to GDP positively, with 1 percent increase in per capita GDP leading to a 0.5 rise in that 
measure. The estimate is also statistically significant for developing countries and the OECD run 
separately.  These results are consistent with the assumed positive relationship between overall 
level of development and the affordability of capital spending.  
57. Higher levels of government debt, or lower fiscal space, reduce aggregate public 
investment.  A 1 percentage point increase in the ratio of government debt to GDP will lead to a 
decrease of 0.3 percentage points of public fixed capital formation to GDP.  Besides, for each 
additional percentage point of cash deficit to GDP, or the revenue minus expense and the 
acquisition of nonfinancial assets, there will be a decrease of 0.04 in public fixed capital 
formation. However, for the sample of developing countries the coefficient is not statistically 
significant.  These results are consistent with the idea that countries with greater fiscal space 
would be able to invest in capital stocks and maintain them more sustainably.  
58. Finally, greater government effectiveness would seem to reduce aggregate fixed capital 
formation but increase the quality of infrastructure.  A point increase in the average score for 
government effectiveness would lead to a 0.8 decrease in capital formation. The coefficient is 
higher for the developing country sample, supporting the hypothesized association between low 
capacity and larger public investment allocations.   
Quality of Infrastructure 
59. The results are also consistent with the hypothesis that greater decentralization would 
contribute to improving the quality of infrastructure services. As shown in Table 5, an increase 
of 10 percentage points in the subnational share of revenue will lead to 0.1 points in the overall 
score for quality of infrastructure, which given that the score goes from 1 to 7 means a sizeable 
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change. The coefficient for OECD countries is higher, 0.2.  Nevertheless, when the same model 
is used with the data corresponding to non-OECD countries, the coefficient becomes 
insignificant. This may be result of the lower quality of governance and institutions observed in 
developing countries. 
60. The percentage of urban population is positively associated with the overall quality of 
infrastructure, both for OECD and non-OECD countries. The effect is small nonetheless, a 10 
percentage point increase in the share of the population living in urban centers, will result in an 
increase of 0.1 points in the quality score. 
61. Similarly, the results also show that 1 percent change in GDP per capita would increase 
the quality by 0.7 percent, giving support to the proposition that the quality of overall 
infrastructure is positively associated with economic development.  It is important to underscore 
that the coefficients for subnational expenditure are different for developed and developing 
countries. 
62. Concurrently, 1 average point higher in control of corruption and government 
effectiveness would translate into a 0.3 and 1 point higher score for quality of infrastructure, 
respectively.  However, the accountability and voice estimate goes in the opposite direction for 
both dependent variables. Greater accountability appears to be associated with larger shares fixed 
capital formation and also with better quality. An increase of 1 average point of this estimate 
would be accompanied with a drop of 0.8 percentage points in fixed capital formation as share of 
GDP and of 0.6 points in the score of quality of public infrastructure, respectively.  
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Table 4: Multivariate Regression Analysis of Gross Public Fixed Capital Formation (% of GDP) 
  All Non-OECD Countries OECD Countries 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Constant 4.1  
(0.2)*** 
4.4  
(0.2)*** 
3.8  
(0.2)*** 
4.0  
(0.1)*** 
7.5  
(0.6)*** 
9.0  
(0.5)*** 
5.0  
(0.1)*** 
8.6  
(1.2)*** 
8.2  
(1.2)*** 
7.8  
(2.5)*** 
9.0  
(2.4)*** 
0.2  
(2.2) 
2.5  
(2.0) 
SN Revenue Share  -0.01  
(0.0)*** 
            -0.02  
(0.0)*** 
  -0.02  
(0.01)** 
   -0.007 
(0.0) 
  
SN Own Revenue Share of 
Expenditure 
  -0.01  
(0.0)*** 
                     
SN Expenditure Share     -0.01  
(0.0)*** 
          -0.01  
(0.01)** 
  -0.003  
(0.0) 
   -0.02  
(0.0)*** 
SN Cap. Formation Share       0.004 
(0.0)*** 
                 
Access to Sanitation (%)         0.0  
(0.0) 
                
Road Density          -0.0  
(0.0)** 
                
Urbanization Growth         0.4  
(0.1)*** 
    -0.1  
(0.0)*** 
-0.1  
(0.01)*** 
 -0.1  
(0.0)*** 
 -0.1  
(0.0)*** 
 -0.01  
(0.0) 
 -0.03  
(0.0)*** 
Urban Population (% of Total)          -0.1  
(0.0)*** 
          
Population Density         0.0  
(0.0)** 
    0.0  
(0.0)*** 
 0.0  
(0.0)*** 
0.0 (0.0)  0.0  
(0.0) 
0.01  
(0.0)*** 
0.0  
(0.0)*** 
LN GDP per Capita            -0.5  
(0.1)*** 
  0.3  
(0.1)*** 
0.3  
(0.1)** 
0.5  
(0.2)*** 
0.5  
(0.2)** 
0.6  
(0.2)*** 
0.4  
(0.2)** 
GDP per Capita Growth           0.01  
(0.0) 
              
Cash Surplus/Deficit            -0.03  
(0.0)** 
   -0.04  
(0.0)*** 
 -0.03  
(0.01)*** 
0.02  
(0.02) 
0.03  
(0.0)* 
 -0.1  
(0.0)* 
 -0.04  
(0.0)*** 
Central Government Debt (% 
GDP) 
           -0.01  
(0.0)** 
              
Control of Corruption             0.01  
(0.2) 
            
Voice and Accountability              -0.6  
(0.2)*** 
 -0.8  
(0.2)*** 
 -0.7  
(0.2)*** 
 -1.1  
(0.3)*** 
 -1.0 
(0.3)*** 
 -0.4  
(0.2)* 
 -0.1  
(0.2) 
Government Effectiveness              -0.3  
(0.2)** 
0.04  
(0.2)*** 
 -0.01  
(0.2) 
0.03  
(0.3) 
0.1  
(0.3) 
0.1  
(0.2) 
0.07  
(0.1) 
LN Population Total                -0.6  
(0.1)*** 
 -0.6  
(0.1)*** 
 -0.3  
(0.3) 
  -0.4  
(0.3) 
 -0.8  
(0.1)*** 
 -0.6  
(0.1)*** 
LN Surface Area (sq. km)               0.7  
(0.1)*** 
0.7  
(0.1)*** 
0.4  
(0.3) 
0.5  
(0.3) 
0.9  
(0.1)*** 
0.7  
(0.1)*** 
N 882 753 890 452 425 802 1848 453 490 311 324 142 166 
N Groups 67 70 69 60 87 81 159 58 63 44 47 14 16 
Wald chi2 8 7.1 2.8 0.2 113.7 129.7 104.1 224.8 151.5 158.1 116.9 114.5 87.8 
Prob > chi2 0 0 0.1 0.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) **   Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) *   Significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed)  
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Table 5: Multivariate Regression Analysis of Overall Quality of Infrastructure 
  All NonOECD Countries OECD Countries  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Constant 
6.5  
(0.8)*** 
6.0  
(0.8)*** 
4.3  
(0.9)*** 
3.0  
(1.3)** 
3.9  
(0.1)*** 
0.1  
(0.2) 
 -2.1  
(0.5)*** 
3.8  
(0.0)*** 
1.8  
(0.6)*** 
0.5  
(0.5) 
1.7  
(1.1) 
1.7  
(1.0)* 
4.8  
(1.2)*** 
2.8  
(1.4)** 
SN Revenue Share 
0.02  
(0.0)***               
0.01 
 (0.0)*   
 -0.0001 
(0.0) 
 
0.02  
(0.0)***   
SN Own Revenue Share of 
Expenditure   
0.004  
(0.0)**                      
SN Expenditure Share 
    
0.01  
(0.0)**             
0.003 
(0.0)***   
 -0.004 
 (0.0)   
0.01  
(0.0)*** 
SN Cap. Formation Share 
      
0.002  
(0.0)***                    
Gross Public Fixed Capital 
Formation (% of GDP)         
 -0.01  
(0.01)*                   
Access to Sanitation (%) 
          
0.02  
(0.0)***                 
Road Density 
          
0.002  
(0.0)***                 
Urbanization Growth 
          
0.2  
(0.0)***     
0.0  
(0.0) 
0.01 
(0.0)*** 
0.02  
(0.0)*** 
0.02  
(0.0)*** 
0.01  
(0.0) 
0.02  
(0.0)*** 
Urban Population (% of Total) 
          
0.03  
(0.0)***           
Population Density 
          
0.0  
(0.0)     
 -0.0  
(0.0)** 
 -0.0 
(0.0)*** 
0.0  
(0.0) 
0.0  
(0.0) 
 -0.0  
(0.0)*** 
 -0.0  
(0.0)*** 
LN GDP per Capita 
            
0.7  
(0.1)***   
0.2  
(0.1)*** 
0.2  
(0.1)*** 
0.2  
(0.1)* 
0.2  
(0.1)** 
 -0.04  
(0.1) 
 -0.1  
(0.1) 
GDP per Capita Growth 
            
 -0.01  
(0.0)**   
 -0.0  
(0.0) 
0.0  
(0.0) 
0.0  
(0.0) 
0.0  
(0.0) 
0.0  
(0.0) 
0.0  
(0.0) 
Cash Surplus/Deficit 
            
0.03  
(0.0)***   
 -0.01  
(0.0)*** 
 -0.02  
(0.0)*** 
 -0.02 
 (0.0)* 
 -0.02  
(0.0)** 
 -0.0  
(0.0) 
 -0.01  
(0.0) 
Central Government Debt (% 
GDP)             
0.01  
(0.0)***   
0.0  
(0.0) 
0.0  
(0.0) 
 -0.0  
(0.0) 
 -0.0 
(0.0) 
 -0.0  
(0.0) 
 -0.0 
 (0.0) 
Control of Corruption 
              
0.4  
(0.1)*** 
0.3  
(0.1)*** 
0.3  
(0.1)*** 
 -0.3  
(0.2) 
 -0.2  
(0.2) 
0.3  
(0.1)*** 
0.3 
 (0.1)** 
Voice and Accountability 
              
 -0.2  
(0.1)*** 
 -0.6  
(0.1)*** 
 -0.7  
(0.1)*** 
 -0.6  
(0.1)*** 
 -0.7  
(0.1)*** 
 -0.2  
(0.2)*** 
0.03 
 (0.2) 
Government Effectiveness 
              
0.9  
(0.1)*** 
1.0  
(0.1)*** 
1.0  
(0.1)*** 
1.2  
(0.2)*** 
1.3  
(0.2)*** 
0.6  
(0.1) 
0.5  
(0.1)*** 
LN Population Total 
 -0.04  
(0.1) 
 -0.04  
(0.1) 
0.1  
(0.1)* 
0.3  
(0.1)***         
0.1  
(0.0)* 
0.2  
(0.0)*** 
0.1  
(0.1) 
0.1  
(0.1) 
0.1  
(0.1)*** 
0.2  
(0.1)*** 
LN Surface Area (sq. km) 
 -0.2  
(0.1)*** 
 -0.1  
(0.1)* 
 -0.2  
(0.1)*** 
 -0.3  
(0.1)*** 
        
 -0.10  
(0.0)*** 
 -0.2  
(0.0)*** 
 -0.2  
(0.1)*** 
 -0.2  
(0.1)*** 
 -0.2  
(0.0)*** 
 -0.2  
(0.1)*** 
N 464 447 508 424 896 430 455 1028 304 268 128 135 176 205 
N Groups 63 67 69 65 115 86 64 132 44 45 23 25 21 24 
Wald chi2 7.4 17 13.1 11.9 3.5 2057.8 290.8 2463.7 1370.6 2084.7 193.5 549.9 281.8 149.9 
Prob > chi2 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) **   Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) *   Significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed)  
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Table 6: Multivariate Regression Analysis of Subnational Share of Net Fixed Capital Formation (% of Total) 
 All Non-OECD Countries  OECD Countries  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Constant 7.1  
(1.2)*** 
53.1  
(3.6)*** 
14.3  
(1.4)*** 
53.5  
(2.1)*** 
21.3  
(12.1)* 
8.9  
(11.3) 
29.5  
(1.2)*** 
 -72.3  
(15.3)*** 
 -72.3  
(15.3)*** 
 -20.0 
(46.0) 
 -80.2  
(23.4)*** 
0.2  
(2.2) 
 -22.2  
(39.2) 
Decentralization          0.7 
(0.2)*** 
   
SN Revenue Share 1.6  
(0.1)*** 
      0.7  
(0.1)*** 
   -0.0001  
(0.0) 
 
SN Own Revenue Share of 
Expenditure 
  -0.1  
(0.1) 
           
SN Expenditure Share   1.5  
(0.1)*** 
     0.7  
(0.1)*** 
 0.8  
(0.2)*** 
-0.01  
(0.0) 
0.5  
(0.2)*** 
Gross Public Fixed Capital 
Formation (% of GDP) 
    -1.8  
(0.3)*** 
         
Access to Sanitation (%)      -0.1  
(0.1) 
        
Road Density     0.02  
(0.0) 
        
Urbanization Growth     1.8  
(1.6) 
        
Urban Population (% of Total)     0.5  
(0.1)*** 
   -0.2  
(0.1)* 
 -0.2  
(0.1)* 
-0.3  
(0.3) 
 -0.1  
(0.2) 
0.01  
(0.0)*** 
 -0.5  
(0.3)* 
Population Density      -0.04  
(0.0)*** 
   -0.01  
(0.0) 
 -0.01  
(0.0) 
0.0 (0.0)  -0.1  
(0.0)*** 
0.6  
(0.2)*** 
 -0.0  
(0.0) 
LN GDP per Capita      6.2  
(1.2)*** 
 3.1  
(1.6)* 
3.1  
(1.6)* 
1.5 (3.9)  0.8  
(2.3) 
-0.1  
(0.0)*** 
2.0  
(3.7)*** 
GDP per Capita Growth       -0.1  
(0.2) 
       
Cash Surplus/Deficit       -0.2  
(0.2) 
       
Central Government Debt (% 
GDP) 
      -0.2  
(0.1)*** 
  -0.1  
(0.03)*** 
 -0.1 
(0.0)*** 
-0.2 
(0.1)*** 
 -0.04  
(0.0) 
-0.4  
(0.2)* 
 -0.2  
(0.1)*** 
Control of Corruption        -8.9  
(2.4)*** 
5.2  
(1.6)*** 
5.2  
(1.6)*** 
3.6 (2.8) 0.4  
(2.8) 
0.1  
(0.2) 
1.4  
(2.8) 
Voice and Accountability       1.4  
(1.9) 
      
Government Effectiveness       25.5  
(2.4)*** 
       
LN Population Total        6.6  
(1.1)*** 
6.5  
(1.1)*** 
4.0 
(1.8)** 
11.5  
(1.5)*** 
 -0.8  
(0.1)*** 
5.3  
(1.7)*** 
LN Surface Area (sq. km)                -0.8  
(1.1) 
 -0.8  
(1.1) 
0.7 
(1.7)*** 
 -6.2  
(1.5)*** 
0.9  
(0.1)*** 
0.8  
(1.9) 
N 536 457 603 452 257 359 528 322 322 156 132 142 190 
N Groups 68 62 73 60 55 47 73 47 47 20 24 14 23 
Wald chi2 1554.1 1.7 732.2 37.5 43.6 32.5 303.9 666.3 666.3 305.8 566.2 114.5 188.3 
Prob > chi2 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) **   Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) *   Significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed) 
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Determinants of the Subnational Share of Fixed Capital Formation 
63. As expected, the share of public fixed capital formation accounted for regional and local 
governments is largely shaped by the level fiscal decentralization as shown in Table 6.  Increases 
in the percentage of revenue or expenditure that subnational governments carry on generate 
similar increases in their share of capital formation.  In the sub-sample of OECD, the share of 
urban population and population density further add 0.01 and 0.6, respectively. Additionally, a 
percentage increase in the total population increases the subnational governments’ share of 
capital formation by 6.5.  
64. Decentralization of public investment appears to be positively impacted by GDP per 
capita.  For every percentage increase in GDP per capita there would be an additional 3.1 
percentage points to the subnational share of fixed capital formation. Similarly, countries would 
have on average a subnational share that is 5.5 higher for every point added to the estimate of 
control of corruption.  Lastly, greater indebtedness, on the other hand, reduces the subnational 
share by 0.2 percentage points of total fixed capital formation.  
V. A Closer Look at Allocative Efficiency in Public Investment:  The Cases of 
Argentina and Mexico   
65. Decentralized management of capital expenditures is expected to increase allocative 
efficiency as local officials are better placed to identify citizens’ priorities and preferences.  
Local officials have more direct access to better and more up-to-date information about the 
evolving needs of their jurisdiction than central bureaucracies. In some cases, citizens may have 
the channels to influence local decision-making more directly, for example through voice 
mechanisms such as participatory budgeting. If informational gains were to be realized, it would 
be expected that capital spending be more responsive to infrastructure gaps than before the 
implementation of decentralization reforms.  In other words, larger infrastructure needs should 
be accompanied by higher levels of spending, and vice versa. Thus, devolution of fiscal and 
administrative functions should contribute to correct existing distortions in capital spending and  
horizontal disparities in access to infrastructure services across jurisdictions.  
66. Whether decentralization has had an impact on the horizontal distribution of capital 
spending is a critical question that remains unaddressed.  Understanding if decentralization 
changes the distribution of capital spending across subnational units and whether it helps to close 
horizontal gaps requires analyzing data at the subnational  level. Given that information on 
outcomes and allocations by jurisdictions is not available for cross-sectional analysis, I examine 
the issue through two brief country cases. 
67. In this section, the experiences of Argentina and Mexico, two large federal countries, are 
used to illustrate how decentralization may lead to dissimilar outcomes as a result of different 
intergovernmental fiscal framework design choices.  Both countries have devolved sizable shares 
of fiscal resources to subnational governments since the mid-1980s, in particular to second tier 
governments (see Figure 5 and Figure 7).  More recently, in 2007, Mexico introduced a new 
change in the equalization formula.  At the same time, in both cases, levels of capital formation 
have continued to rise since 1995 and much of the increase is accounted for subnational levels 
(see Figure 6 and Figure 8).  
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Figure 5: Subnational Share of Expenditure in 
Argentina, 1980-2010 
Figure 6: Gross Public Fixed Capital Formation in 
Argentina, 1995-2010 
  
Source: IMF GFS 2012, World Bank Indicators 2012. Source: IMF WEO 2012. 
  
Figure 7: Subnational Share of Expenditure in 
Mexico, 1995-2010 
Figure 8: Gross Public Fixed Capital Formation in 
Mexico, 1995-2010 
  
Source: IMF GFS 2012, World Bank Indicators 2012. Source: IMF WEO 2012. 
68. In each case, the before and after distribution of public investment across subnational 
units is compared.   Also, how well the resulting distribution responds to the needs/infrastructure 
gaps of various localities is examined.  The percentage of households with access to running 
water is used to proxy the infrastructure gap.  This indicator was chosen because it is available 
for each of the cases at the province/state level in census reports.  Access to running water is also 
a fairly reliable indicator as it is highly correlated with other measures of infrastructure 
availability, such as access to improved sanitation, coverage of telecommunication services, and 
road density.  Data on the dependent variable, public fixed capital formation and capital 
spending, were drawn from official government statistics and annual budget reports. 
Argentina 
69. As many other countries in Latin America, Argentina is characterized by an unequal 
distribution of economic wealth and population.  The four major provinces—Buenos Aires, 
Santa Fe, Córdoba and Mendoza—account for 78 percent of the GDP and 70 percent of the 
country’s population.  For most of its contemporary history, the country remained centralized 
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despite having a federal system.  The frequent democratic breakdowns sustained and reinforced 
centralization.  The national government directly provided most services, even basic and 
secondary education and basic health until the early 1980s.  
70. But after re-democratization in 1983, provincial governments and municipalities have 
consistently expanded their control over service delivery and resources, and they currently 
control almost half of government expenditure and revenue.  The original coparticipation 
formula adopted in 1988 included various indicators of expenditure needs to determine the 
distribution of a common pool of tax revenue.  However, later revisions and introduction of new 
taxes have eroded the system and transfers are no longer necessarily aligned with needs in all 
cases; a considerable share of the common resource pool is now being distributed on an ad hoc 
basis.  
71. The process of decentralization accelerated in the late 1980s.In 1992, the subnational 
share of expenditure stabilized at 45% through the  ‘second’ coparticipation agreement between 
the national government and the provinces.  This agreement limited the percentage of federal 
revenue to be shared with provinces  and it was part of a macroeconomic stabilization package.  
In exchange for such reduction, the provincial governments were guaranteed a minimum revenue 
floor.  In years of economic growth, this arrangement favored the federal government, but in 
years of recession the revenue floor provided provinces with secured minimum amount of 
resources.  This provision made fiscal adjustment more difficult during the  2001-2002 crisis. 
72. The rapid move toward fiscal decentralization was reflected in the distribution of capital 
spending across levels of government. Subnational governments came to total 80 percent of 
gross fixed capital formation in 1992, a level that has remained stable, with the exception of 
2001 when 90 percent was reached.  Provinces currently account for more than two thirds of that 
share and the rest is the responsibility of municipalities.  Concomitantly, the absolute volume 
invested in fixed assets has more than doubled since 1993. Provinces and municipalities 
contributed 70 percent of the increase (see Figure 9). Despite the acute nature of the 2001 fiscal 
crisis, public investment returned to previous levels by 2003-2004 and has continue to grow 
since. National investments have also risen, but these remain highly concentrated in Buenos 
Aires (see Figure 10).   
Figure 9: Gross Public Fixed Capital Formation (1993 constant 
prices), 1993-2006  
Figure 10: National Government Gross Public Fixed Capital 
Formation by Province (1993 constant prices), 1992 and2010  
  
Source: INDEC 2012. Source: INDEC 2012. 
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73. Despite the risks to macro-economic stability that the existing intergovernmental system 
entail, the guaranteed threshold prevented a bigger drop at the subnational level of capital 
spending during the 2001 crisis. Since 1992, most provinces increased  public fixed capital 
formation per capita, but the biggest gains were observed in Salta, Santa Cruz, and Rio Negro 
provinces that have benefited from growing mineral royalties (see Figure 11).  Only one 
province, Tucúman, has seen a decline in the per capita capital formation. In the short term, 
moving away from a pegged currency in 2002 created additional fiscal space for provinces as 
inflation reduced the share of the budget needed to pay wages and other current expenditures.   
Figure 12 shows that spending per capita varies considerably across provinces.   
Figure 11: Gross Public Fixed Capital Formation per 
Capita (1993 constant-ordered by poverty rate), 1992 
and 2010  
Figure 12: Total Provincial Expenditures per Capita 
in Argentina (ordered by poverty rates), 2010  
  
Source: INDEC 2012. Source: INDEC 2012. 
74. The stock and quality of infrastructure in Argentina lags behind the country’s level of 
economic development and remains very unequally distributed.  This is the legacy of 
centralization and decades of underinvestment and poor maintenance of existing assets. Although 
the range has narrowed since decentralization started, outcome measures for infrastructure 
services still vary widely across provinces.  For example, the percentage of households without 
access to running water and improved sanitation is close a 25 percent for Chaco, Formosa or 
Santiago and over 28 percent for Misiones, while only half of a percentage point in the City of 
Buenos Aires.   
75. The amount that provincial governments invest in public infrastructure is equally 
variable.  While some provinces invest US$ 8 per capita, others go as far as US$ 310. However, 
leaving outliers aside, a before-and-after comparison (Figure 13 and Figure 14) shows that 
presently there is a greater correspondence between allocations and infrastructure gaps than 
before.  
76. Some of the poorest provinces—such as Corrientes, Chaco, Formosa and Jujuy—have 
increased capital spending per capita several folds.  While poorer provinces remain dependent on 
federal transfers, many other have successfully increased own revenue and used it to finance new 
infrastructure projects. In this case, the evidence support the expectation that decentralization 
would contribute to increasing allocative efficiency capital spending. 
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Figure 13:  Capital Expenditure per Capita and 
Infrastructure Needs by Province, 1992 
Figure 14: Capital Expenditure per Capita and 
Infrastructure Needs by Province, 2010 
  
Source: INDEC 2012. Source: INDEC 2012. 
Mexico 
77. Mexico started devolving functions and resources to states only in the early 1990s with 
the transfer of primary education responsibilities and, later, of health services.  The country has 
not gone as far in implementing decentralization as other federations in the region. States and 
municipalities are responsible for approximately 30 percent of public expenditures and little over 
20 percent of public fixed capital formation is  done at the subnational level.   
78. Mexico is marked by a very uneven distribution in economic development and 
population.  Of its 112 million inhabitants, almost 20 percent are concentrated in the Federal 
District’s metropolitan area.   The level of dependence from federal transfers varies considerably 
as well.  While some states finance up to 90 percent of their budget with transfers, as in the case 
of Coahuila, others are largely reliant on their own revenues as in the case of Nuevo Leon, with 
transfers representing only 22 percent of their expenditure.   
79. Mexico’s inter-governmental transfer system prior to 2007 distributed half of the revenue 
derived from several ‘assignable’ taxesincluding excise and vehicle taxesaccording to their 
origin and the rest according to population.  The federal government was in charge of setting the 
tax rate and base and collecting the revenue. Subnational governments had little influence over 
what revenue would be mobilized. Because these taxes correlate with economic activity and 
local revenue, there was little room for equalization or to incentivize own revenue mobilization 
within the transfer system.  In parallel, there were a number of earmarked transfers for specific 
purposes that were given to states and municipalities, including capital grants.  
80. The formulae were updated to promote a more equitable distribution of federal transfers 
according to expenditure needs. In the current system, per capita unconditional grants are 
calculated on the basis of per capita GDP growth and revenue effort. Conditional grants are 
primarily used for cost reimbursements, particularly of teacher salaries. The new formula 
guarantees states transfers at no less than 2007 levels.  
81. With the introduction of the revised transfer system, the amount of resources that states 
receive without earmarking went from 204 billion Mexican pesos in 2006 to 239 in 2010.  The 
new system favors poorer regions and provides states with greater autonomy and discretion over 
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spending choices. Yet in many cases, states and municipalities continue to be overwhelmed with 
not fully funded mandates and spend most of their resources on the education and health wage 
bills. Consequently, non-earmarked resources are mainly used to cover recurrent expenditures.  
82. The nominal amount of state fixed capital formation has also risen, going from 4 billion 
Mexican pesos in 2003 to 205 billion in 2011.  These figures are equivalent to an average of 405 
Mexican pesos per capita or 37 US$ in 2003 and to 1,969 Mexican pesos per capita or 151 US$ 
in 2010 (see Error! Reference source not found.).The federal government continues to be 
responsible for the majority of fixed capital formation.  
83. When comparing levels of investment before and after the formula reform, it appears that 
the distribution of fixed capital formation per capita has become more scattered.  While the 
average level of investment in 2003 was considerably lower, states were much closer to each 
other than they are currently (see Error! Reference source not found.). There also seems to be 
little correspondence between the per capita capital formation and poverty levels.  
Figure 15: Gross Fixed Capital Formation by 
Government Entity, 2010 
Figure 16:  Gross Public Fixed Capital Formation 
Per Capita (by poverty level), 2003 and 2010 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance of Mexico, 2012. Source: INEGI 2012. 
84. As well, investment per capita has become less aligned with infrastructure gaps than prior 
to the change of allocation formula (see Figure 17 and Figure 18).  For example, in Chiapas and 
Guerrero more than a quarter of households do not have access to running water or sewage.  
Though these states have more than double increased fixed capital formation, yet their per capita 
investment are about half of that of Yucatan or Colima, where the coverage is almost complete.  
In this case, it appears that decentralization may have contributed to worsen the correspondence 
between needs and investment levels.   
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Figure 17:  Gross Public Fixed Capital Formation 
per Capita and Infrastructure Needs by State, 2003 
Figure 18:  Gross Public Fixed Capital Formation 
per Capita and Infrastructure Needs by State, 2010 
  
Source: INEGI 2012. Source: INEGI 2012. 
85. The two cases help illustrate that although decentralization can help address horizontal 
disparities in infrastructure endowments, the outcome ultimately depends on the features of the 
intergovernmental fiscal framework and the incentives it creates.  While in Argentina greater 
local autonomy in expenditure management contributed to increasing public investment and 
better aligning spending levels with needs, in the case of Mexico decentralization has led to a 
slower growth of subnational capital spending and a lower allocative efficiency.  Differences in 
own revenues and access to financing are some of the main drivers behind this.  In the case of 
Argentina, provinces have a minimum of resources that are guaranteed every year.  This, to some 
extent, shields them from the overall volatility in federal revenue.  At the same time, Argentina 
enjoys greater autonomy regarding public salaries and can more easily access financing that 
states in the case of Mexico. 
VI. Conclusions 
86. The relationship between decentralization and outcomes in infrastructure services remain 
largely understudied, in particular in the context of developing countries. Having reviewed the 
existing evidence, this paper highlights the pressing need for expanding data collection efforts 
and refining definitions around public investment at the national and subnational levels. Many of 
the predictions found in the literature and the assumptions that these hinge on cannot be tested 
with the available data.  In a large number of countries not even the most basic monitoring or 
analysis on public investment portfolios is possible.  Consequently, there is an important agenda 
for development partners, and the developing countries implementing decentralization reforms 
they assist, to improve the quality and coverage of data.  
87. The existing evidence suggests that decentralization leads to lower aggregate levels of 
fixed capital formation.  This may be reflective of efficiency gains, but it also raises concerns 
about potentially insufficient access to financing and steady funding sources for subnational 
governments.  Lower investment rates can also be symptomatic of the fact that provinces and 
municipalities may be prioritizing other types of social investments over infrastructure.  The 
results from the econometric analysis should be interpreted with caution as the available 
indicators only offer very imperfect approximations to the variables needed to more adequately 
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analyze the impact of decentralization on public investment efficiency.  On the other hand, with 
the necessary caveats in mind, the two cases discussed in the previous section show that, under 
certain conditions, decentralization can lead to a better horizontal allocation of capital spending 
and favor lagging regions.  
88. Future research and policy work on decentralized infrastructure provision should consider 
several issues. The review of the literature and the analysis of the cases also point to the need of 
paying greater attention to better aligning the incentives provided by the intergovernmental fiscal 
system for subnational levels to respond to infrastructure needs. It is not uncommon for countries 
in which subnational governments heavily rely on vertical transfers to end up with uneven, 
excessively fragmented, or misaligned levels of capital spending.   
89. The design of transfer and revenue-sharing systems should also pay closer attention to 
providing mechanisms for vertical coordination and promoting inter-jurisdictional cooperation.  
Both matching grants and technical assistance may be attractive tools to ensure that regional 
infrastructure is not neglected.  Improving the ability for collective action among subnational 
governments would also be important in helping them to access financing and get better bids.  
States and, especially municipalities, can greatly benefit from pooling together risks and 
resources. Vertical coordination is as important as the horizontal one.  Infrastructure provision 
implies the joint production of assets and the management of networks that require coordinated 
actions by various levels of government.  Many countries are creating institutions to facilitate 
dialogue and decision-making across levels of government and using regional development 
strategies and contracts to implement joint agreements.  
90. Similarly, central government may assist state and local governments to access financing 
by facilitating borrowing, providing subsidized loans, acting as guarantors in loans to 
subnational, or temporarily relaxing fiscal rules.  Yet there are important lessons to be learned 
from Latin America and Southern Europe on the danger of excessive subnational borrowing and 
its implication for fiscal stability.  
91. Greater predictability and transparency of vertical transfers is a critical ingredient for 
better public investment management. As well, measures that delink annual revenues from 
spending are a necessary ingredient for medium-term predictability in infrastructure envelopes. 
Increasing the revenue base of subnational governments and incentivizing them to raise their 
own revenues can help to stabilize and smooth capital spending overtime.  
92. Another dimension of infrastructure provision in multi-tiered governments that is often 
overlooked is the quality of public investment management systems.  Central governments, and 
development partners, can support and encourage subnational units to strengthen public 
investment management system and ‘invest to invest’ by establishing a more systematic 
preparation, appraisal, selection, and implementation of infrastructure investment projects.   
93. To end, there is also great potential to mobilize demand side governance around public 
investment at the subnational level by helping improve the capacity of civil society and oversight 
institutions to act collectively and demand that public resources are invested in the assets that 
generate greater public benefits. Capital expenditure tracking surveys could be used to monitor 
financing flows to actual contracts and physical works and leverage some of citizens to local 
government officials.  
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Annex I: Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
Table 7: Dependent and Independent Variables Definitions 
Variable Description 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation, 
Public (% of GDP). 
Source: International Monetary Fund WEO Database. 
Sub-national Expenditure Share Percentage of total expenditures by subnational governments, measured as the sum of local and state total 
expenditures minus state to local grants, divided by the sum of local, state, and national expenditures. 
Scale 0 to 100. Source: Decentralization Indicators Database 2012, by the World Bank, based on IMF’s 
Government Finance Statistics. 
Sub-national Net Fixed Capital 
Formation Share 
Percentage of total net fixed capital formation accounted for by subnational governments, measured as the 
sum of local and state divided by the sum of local, state, and national net fixed capital formation. Scale 0 
to 100. Source: Decentralization Indicators Database 2012, by the World Bank, based on IMF’s 
Government Finance Statistics. 
Sub-national Own Source 
Revenue as a Share of Sub-
national Expenditure 
Percentage of expenditures financed with subnational governments’ own source revenue, measured as the 
sum of local and state revenues minus grants received from other levels of government, divided by the 
total subnational expenditures. 
Sub-national Revenue Share Percentage of total revenues accounted for by subnational governments, measured as the sum of local and 
state total revenues minus grants from state to local government, divided by the sum of local, state, and 
national revenues. Scale 0 to 100. Source: Decentralization Indicators Database, by the World Bank 2012, 
based on IMF’s Government Finance Statistics. 
Sub-national Tax Effort  Percentage of tax revenues collected by subnational governments, measured as the sum of local and state 
tax revenues, divided by the sum of local, state, and national tax revenues. Scale 0 to 100. Source: 
Decentralization Indicators Database 2012, by the World Bank, based on IMF’s Government Finance 
Statistics.  
GNI per Capita  Data in constant 2000 dollars. Source: World Development Indicators 2012, by the World Bank. 
Population Total population. Source: World Development Indicators 2012, by the World Bank. 
Surface Area  Data in squared kilometers. Source: World Development Indicators 2012, by the World Bank. 
Federation 1 if Federal Country, 0 if otherwise. Scale from 0 to 1. Source: Political Decentralization Indicators 
Database. 
Source: IMF GFS 2012, IMF WEO 2012, and World Bank Indicators 2012. 
 
Table 8: Correlation Coefficients, World 
 Gen. Gov. 
Final Cons. 
Expenditur
e (% of 
GDP) 
Overall 
Quality of 
Infrastruct
ure  
Gross 
Public 
Fixed Cap. 
Form.(% 
of GDP) 
SN 
Revenue 
Share 
SN Own 
Source 
Revenue 
Share of 
Expenditur
e 
SN 
Expenditur
e Share 
SN Capital 
Expenditur
e Share 
Overall Quality of Infrastructure 0.19***  
     Gross Public Fixed Capital Formation 
(% of GDP) 0.13*** -0.14***  
    SN Share of Revenue (% of Total Rev.) 0.10*** 0.31*** -0.08**  
   SN Own Source Rev. (% of SN Exp.) -0.08** 0.23*** -0.11*** 0.28***  
  SN Share of Expenditure  0.10*** 0.32*** -0.11*** 0.96*** 0.20***   
SN Share of Cap. Exp enditure 0.15*** 0.41*** -0.12*** 0.32** 0.15*** 0.32***  
GNI per Capita (US$ constant 2000) 0.26*** 0.48*** -0.07*** 0.24*** 0.10*** 0.20*** 0.23*** 
LN Surface Area (sq. km) -0.14*** -0.20*** -0.09*** 0.45*** 0.20*** 0.41*** 0.11*** 
High Income  0.23*** 0.44*** -0.09*** 0.21*** 0.04*** 0.14*** 0.22*** 
OECD 0.22*** 0.34*** -0.11*** 0.30*** 0.04*** 0.27*** 0.22*** 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) **   Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) *   Significant at the 0.10 level 
(2-tailed) 
Source: IMF GFS 2012, IMF WEO 2012, and World Bank Indicators 2012.  
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Table 9: Number of Observations and Averages by Country, 1990-2009 
 
1990-1999 2000-2009 
Variable Obs Mean St. Dev. Obs Mean St. Dev. 
Africa 
Overall Quality of Infrastructure (1=low, 7=high) — — — 195 3.1 1.1 
Public Investment (% of GDP) 404 7.0 7.4 543 8.3 22.7 
SN Share of Revenue (% of Total Revenue) 20 18.8 15.2 33 13.7 15.7 
SN Own Source Revenue (% of SN Expenditure) 22 43.6 18.1 66 43.8 25.7 
SN Share of Expenditure (% of Total Expenditure) 20 15.6 12.8 39 25.4 33.9 
SN Share of Capital Expenditure (% of Total Cap. Exp.) 2 68.2 4.1 31 27.5 35.5 
SN Capital Expenditure (% of SN Expediture) 2 9.2 1.8 63 22.6 17.9 
       
East Asia Pacific 
Overall Quality of Infrastructure (1=low, 7=high) — — — 106 4.8 6.3 
Public Investment (% of GDP) 104 8.5 6.6 171 7.3 5.1 
SN Share of Revenue (% of Total Revenue) 33 16.5 10.5 23 31.8 22.0 
SN Own Source Revenue (% of SN Expenditure) 21 55.8 27.2 19 70.3 14.0 
SN Share of Expenditure (% of Total Expenditure) 34 15.9 12.1 19 18.6 12.2 
SN Share of Capital Expenditure (% of Total Cap. Exp.) 0 
  
15 33.8 31.9 
SN Capital Expenditure (% of SN Expediture) 0 
  
24 39.3 25.0 
       Europe and Central Asia 
Overall Quality of Infrastructure (1=low, 7=high) — — — 204 3.5 0.9 
Public Investment (% of GDP) 162 4.6 4.5 323 4.9 3.4 
SN Share of Revenue (% of Total Revenue) 98 21.9 8.2 212 22.8 9.1 
SN Own Source Revenue (% of SN Expenditure) 86 68.3 23.8 177 63.3 17.7 
SN Share of Expenditure (% of Total Expenditure) 98 18.6 8.0 224 19.9 9.4 
SN Share of Capital Expenditure (% of Total Cap. Exp.) 10 34.8 25.1 182 43.2 21.1 
SN Capital Expenditure (% of SN Expediture) 6 27.9 17.0 199 20.8 14.2 
       
Latin America and the Caribbean 
Overall Quality of Infrastructure (1=low, 7=high) — — — 197 3.3 0.9 
Public Investment (% of GDP) 271 5.5 3.3 333 5.7 3.4 
SN Share of Revenue (% of Total Revenue) 67 21.2 15.0 78 24.4 21.5 
SN Own Source Revenue (% of SN Expenditure) 45 65.7 23.8 70 64.3 21.5 
SN Share of Expenditure (% of Total Expenditure) 68 17.6 13.0 84 19.4 20.5 
SN Share of Capital Expenditure (% of Total Cap. Exp.) 5 . 641.2 70 35.1 24.5 
SN Capital Expenditure (% of SN Expediture) 5 38.8 7.6 76 27.6 22.2 
       
Middle East and North Africa 
Overall Quality of Infrastructure (1=low, 7=high) — — — 83 4.4 0.9 
Public Investment (% of GDP) 144 7.0 2.9 199 7.9 5.6 
SN Share of Revenue (% of Total Revenue) 0 
  
21 8.2 1.9 
SN Own Source Revenue (% of SN Expenditure) 0 
  
10 80.2 5.5 
SN Share of Expenditure (% of Total Expenditure) 0 
  
24 4.5 1.7 
SN Share of Capital Expenditure (% of Total Cap. Exp.) 0 
  
18 18.6 8.6 
SN Capital Expenditure (% of SN Expediture) 0 
  
5 35.0 19.7 
       
OECD 
Overall Quality of Infrastructure (1=low, 7=high) — — — 223 5.6 0.9 
Public Investment (% of GDP) 118 3.5 1.6 176 3.0 1.2 
SN Share of Revenue (% of Total Revenue) 175 32.4 13.5 228 30.7 15.5 
SN Own Source Revenue (% of SN Expenditure) 173 66.7 21.3 221 62.6 19.6 
SN Share of Expenditure (% of Total Expenditure) 193 28.6 14.1 265 28.6 14.9 
SN Share of Capital Expenditure (% of Total Cap. Exp.) 36 61.7 24.6 202 63.9 24.6 
SN Capital Expenditure (% of SN Expediture) 50 6.2 7.4 239 8.0 8.1 
       
South Asia 
Overall Quality of Infrastructure (1=low, 7=high) — — — 40 2.9 0.7 
Public Investment (% of GDP) 63 8.9 5.3 90 8.9 8.0 
SN Share of Revenue (% of Total Revenue) 9 47.0 1.3 14 31.3 23.5 
SN Own Source Revenue (% of SN Expenditure) 9 63.1 3.1 9 67.1 8.7 
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1990-1999 2000-2009 
Variable Obs Mean St. Dev. Obs Mean St. Dev. 
SN Share of Expenditure (% of Total Expenditure) 9 38.3 0.7 14 25.6 19.4 
SN Share of Capital Expenditure (% of Total Cap. Exp.) 0 
  
12 47.3 40.6 
SN Capital Expenditure (% of SN Expediture) 0 
  
9 21.2 10.5 
Source: IMF GFS 2012, IMF WEO 2012, and World Bank Indicators 2012.  
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Table 10: Public Investment and Decentralization Indicators by Country, 2009 (or latest available year) 
 
Overall 
Quality 
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Infrastru
cture 
(1=low, 
7=high) 
Access to 
Electricit
y (% of 
populatio
n) 
Improve
d 
Sanitatio
n 
Facilities 
(% of 
populatio
n with 
access) 
Improve
d Water 
Source 
(% of 
populatio
n with 
access) 
Road 
density 
(km of 
road per 
100 sq. 
km) 
Fuel 
exports 
(% of 
merchan
dise 
exports) 
Gen. 
Gov. 
Final 
Consump
tion 
Expendit
ure (% of 
GDP) 
Public 
Invesmte
nt (% of 
GDP) 
SN Share 
of 
Revenue 
(% of 
Total 
Revenue) 
SN Own 
Source 
Revenue 
(% of SN 
Expendit
ure) 
SN Share 
of 
Expendit
ure (% of 
Total 
Expendit
ure) 
SN Share 
of 
Capital 
Expendit
ure (% of 
Total 
Cap. 
Exp.) 
SN 
Capital 
Expendit
ure (% of 
SN 
Expeditu
re) 
Cape Verde  
 
60.0 87.0 33.0 
 
25.7 14.0 12.7 56.2 9.2 14.1 62.1 
Congo, Rep.  37.1 18.0 71.0 5.0 
 
12.2 10.8 1.6 59.1 1.9 2.1 31.5 
Ethiopia 3.2 17.0 20.0 44.0 4.0 0.0 8.2 17.6 
 
23.9  
 
29.3 
Kenya 3.2 16.1 31.0 58.0 11.0 4.2 15.8 3.8 
 
95.3 
  
39.4 
Lesotho 2.9 16.0 26.0 78.0 20.0 
 
39.8 11.8 2.5 44.6 0.8 0.1 1.9 
Mauritius 4.4 99.4 89.0 99.0 101.0 0.0 14.1 6.6 5.7 25.9 5.5 9.7 18.4 
South Africa 4.7 75.0 79.0 91.0 30.0 11.1 21.1 9.2 40.7 29.1 35.9 90.2 12.0 
Swaziland 
  
57.0 68.0 21.0 
 
14.7 8.4 2.2 94.8 2.2 
  Uganda 2.9 9.0 34.0 71.0 29.0 1.4 11.6 5.4 
 
4.6 
  
5.0
Zambia 2.9 18.8 48.0 61.0 12.0 0.9 13.1 3.4 
 
84.6 
  
0.6 
Zimbabwe 3.2 41.5 39.0 80.0 25.0 0.9 13.3 0.8 14.7
 
13.6
  China 4.0 99.4 63.0 90.0 40.0 1.7 13.4 22.9 67.5 79.9
  
7.9
Fiji 
  
83.0 98.0 19.0 0.2 
 
2.9 
 
88.8 
   Indonesia 3.1 64.5 54.0 81.0 25.0 28.4 9.6 4.9 10.9 37.7 9.1
  Korea, Rep. 5.8 
 
100.0 98.0 105.0 6.4 16.0 6.2 40.4 58.0 35.5 83.8 46.1
Malaysia 5.4 99.4 96.0 100.0 30.0 14.8 14.1 10.7 11.4 98.8 10.8 
  Mongolia 1.9 67.0 51.0 82.0 3.0 
 
14.7 6.5 12.9 88.6 11.9 6.6 12.1
Thailand 4.8 99.3 96.0 96.0 35.0 5.2 13.4 6.5 15.0 65.4 5.2 29.6 40.6 
Albania 3.1 
 
94.0 95.0 63.0 11.6 8.8 8.8 20.8 3.5 16.9 
  Armenia 3.5 
 
90.0 98.0 26.0 0.1 13.3 6.3 6.8 49.9 5.7 3.8 17.9
Azerbaijan 4.5 
 
82.0 80.0 61.0 92.9 13.8 8.9 2.2 30.8 3.4 1.7 21.7 
Belarus 
  
93.0 100.0 46.0 37.3 16.9 3.8 31.7 84.1 30.2 54.9 18.8 
Bosnia and Herz 2.0
 
95.0 99.0 43.0 13.1 21.4 7.4 11.3 
 
9.2 35.7 20.3 
Bulgaria 2.8 
 
100.0 100.0 36.0 12.6 16.3 5.1 16.7 37.8 14.4 45.1 36.6 
Croatia 4.5 
 
99.0 99.0 52.0 12.9 21.5 1.8 12.3 98.7 10.4 46.2 19.9 
Czech Republic 4.5 
 
98.0 100.0 166.0 3.6 21.7 5.1 25.2 68.5 19.2 81.4 26.9 
Estonia 5.1 
 
95.0 98.0 129.0 16.2 22.0 3.4 23.0 63.5 21.9 38.2 11.3 
Georgia 3.8 
 
95.0 98.0 29.0 5.0 24.5 8.0 19.6 39.3 13.7 29.0 37.8 
Hungary 4.3 
 
100.0 100.0 212.0 2.5 22.7 
 
22.0 34.6 21.4 29.1 4.1 
Kazakhstan 3.8 
 
97.0 95.0 4.0 70.6 11.7 5.9 43.0 61.5 31.3 75.3 52.6 
Kyrgyz Republic 2.8 
 
93.0 90.0 17.0 6.2 18.4 5.0 
 
56.6 
  
9.7 
Latvia 4.2 
 
78.0 99.0 107.0 5.1 19.6 . 25.4 73.1 19.7 64.3 23.3 
Lithuania 4.9 
 
86.0 92.0 125.0 21.4 21.9 3.9 26.9 39.3 21.6 58.1 10.0 
Macedonia, FYR 3.2 
 
88.0 100.0 54.0 1.1 19.1 6.2 12.5 49.1 10.5 21.1 26.0 
Moldova 
  
85.0 96.0 38.0 0.4 22.1 5.0 23.2 50.6 18.7 50.2 13.2 
Poland 2.6
   
123.0 3.0 18.4 
 
30.6 49.3 25.9 66.0 17.8 
Romania 2.4 
   
83.0 5.9 15.2 5.2 23.6 26.7 16.9 43.9 21.8 
Russian Fed. 3.3 
 
71.0 97.0 6.0 66.7 21.0 4.6 48.8 97.6 32.5 50.7 17.3 
Serbia 2.6 
 
92.0 99.0 50.0 
 
20.2 3.4 15.5 79.7 13.4 55.1 28.7 
Slovak Republic 4.1 
 
100.0 100.0 89.0 4.5 20.1 2.3 18.2 61.0 15.3 10.3 6.9 
Slovenia 5.2 
 
100.0 99.0 192.0 3.3 20.3 
 
19.5 70.9 15.1 55.5 30.9 
Tajikistan 3.2 
 
94.0 64.0 19.0 
 
28.3 13.3
 
72.1 27.7 42.6 98.4 
Turkey 4.2 
 
90.0 99.0 46.0 4.0 14.7 3.7 11.7 54.4 9.0 51.2 28.9 
Ukraine 3.5 
 
94.0 98.0 28.0 5.2 20.1 2.2 28.7 53.5 25.6 59.8 4.5 
Argentina 3.2 97.2 90.0 97.0 8.0 10.3 15.2 4.2 44.3 87.9 42.2 79.8 12.9 
Brazil 3.4 98.3 78.0 97.0 21.0 9.0 21.2 2.1 45.6 76.1 42.9 59.2 9.5 
Chile 5.6 98.5 96.0 96.0 10.0 0.8 12.6 2.8 11.7 70.5 10.0 1.4 1.1 
Colombia 3.4 93.6 77.0 92.0 15.0 50.7 15.8 6.0 30.1 69.9 27.5 12.6 4.3 
Costa Rica 3.4 99.3 95.0 97.0 76.0 0.6 16.8 3.6 6.7 99.0 3.5 8.7 24.8 
Dominican Rep. 3.4 95.9 83.0 86.0 26.0 0.2 7.8 3.6 0.9 36.9 3.0 
  Ecuador 3.1 92.2 92.0 94.0 17.0 49.8 12.3 12.1 18.3 
    El Salvador 4.8 86.4 87.0 87.0 48.0 2.8 10.6 2.2 10.1 72.8 6.3 45.2 48.6
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Guatemala 4.3 80.5 78.0 92.0 13.0 4.1 10.2 3.8 
 
60.3 
   Honduras 3.7 70.3 77.0 87.0 12.0 4.3 18.5 3.4 10.4 70.7 6.6 30.0 79.8
Jamaica 4.4 92.0 80.0 93.0 201.0 17.2 15.4 4.6 
 
80.7 0.5 
  Mexico 3.8 
 
84.0 95.0 19.0 13.5 12.0 6.1 36.7 79.4 16.8 
  Nicaragua 2.7 72.1 52.0 85.0 17.0 0.9 10.8 7.1 8.8 45.3 2.9 
  Panama 4.0 88.1 69.0 93.0 19.0 0.9 10.8 4.8 2.5 
 
2.4 
  Paraguay 2.2 96.7 70.0 86.0 8.0 0.0 11.8 5.5 8.8 67.9 7.5 17.8 36.4
Peru 3.0 85.7 70.0 85.0 10.0 10.3 10.3 5.2 29.4 23.7 20.4 67.3 77.0 
Trinidad and T. 4.4 99.0 92.0 94.0 162.0 79.0 
 
14.2 
 
96.9 4.6 
  Iran   98.4 100.0 96.0 11.0 
  
7.6 6.9
 
2.7 22.5
 Jordan 5.2 99.9 98.0 97.0 9.0 0.6 21.9 8.2 7.7 
 
6.0 18.7 63.3
Morocco 3.7 97.0 70.0 82.0 13.0 2.3 18.2 4.4 10.1 80.7 6.5 16.3 29.1 
Tunisia 5.1 99.5 85.0 94.0 12.0 13.6 16.2 3.2 
 
86.0 2.6 22.0 8.4 
Australia 5.0 
 
100.0 100.0 11.0 32.0 17.6 4.8 38.9 59.0 36.6 
  Austria 6.6 
 
100.0 100.0 127.0 3.5 19.8 
 
30.4 69.1 30.0 29.5
 Belgium 5.8 
 
100.0 100.0 504.0 7.0 24.5 1.7 30.7 39.6 29.3 17.3 0.0
Canada 5.9 
 
100.0 100.0 14.0 25.0 22.1 3.7 61.9 68.9 61.6 90.6 9.0 
Denmark 6.3 
 
100.0 100.0 170.0 7.5 29.8 
 
48.3 43.0 46.7 44.8 0.8 
Finland 6.5 
 
100.0 100.0 23.0 6.6 25.1 2.8 36.7 70.3 35.7 86.7 2.1 
France 6.6 
 
100.0 100.0 173.0 3.6 24.8 3.4 
 
28.9 19.2 87.2 4.9 
Germany 6.5 
 
100.0 100.0 180.0 2.1 20.0 1.6 35.0 83.1 34.9 87.9 0.4 
Greece 4.4 
 
98.0 100.0 89.0 9.5 20.4 
 
8.1 39.4 5.2 40.0 13.7 
Iceland 6.3 
 
100.0 100.0 13.0 1.0 26.5 
 
29.9 89.0 25.1 60.7 6.5 
Ireland 4.1 
 
99.0 100.0 137.0 0.7 19.9 
   
11.4 69.8 27.8 
Israel 4.5 99.7 100.0 100.0 83.0 0.0 24.0 1.7 14.1 65.1 12.5 68.7 3.1 
Italy 3.8 
  
100.0 162.0 3.6 21.4 2.5 29.5 49.5 26.8 
 
3.5 
Japan 5.8 
 
100.0 100.0 320.0 1.8 19.9 4.7 58.5 56.8 45.9 63.5 1.8 
Luxembourg 6.1 
 
100.0 100.0 202.0 1.3 16.9 
 
12.1 61.8 10.5 50.5 19.9 
Malta 4.6 
 
100.0 100.0 968.0 1.6 21.2 
 
1.7 24.9 1.3 
 
15.3 
Netherlands 5.8 
 
100.0 100.0 329.0 8.2 28.7 3.8 29.2 29.7 26.9 69.8 4.3 
New Zealand 4.7 
  
100.0 35.0 5.1 20.3 5.4 10.0 90.7 9.2 65.7 23.4 
Norway 5.2 
 
100.0 100.0 29.0 63.0 22.5 3.6 22.5 58.0 28.4 48.9 5.4 
Portugal 5.7 
 
100.0 99.0 90.0 4.9 22.1 3.0 
 
95.7 13.6 45.4 5.7 
Spain 5.2 
 
100.0 100.0 132.0 4.4 21.3 
 
47.0 55.2 40.5 76.3 9.5 
Sweden 6.2 
 
100.0 100.0 129.0 6.1 27.7 
 
43.7 79.4 43.4 52.7 2.5 
Switzerland 6.8 
 
100.0 100.0 173.0 2.8 11.6 2.0 51.3 80.5 51.1 82.8 1.0 
United Kingdom 5.2 
 
100.0 100.0 172.0 11.2 23.5 2.9 28.0 30.3 22.7 48.2 5.9 
United States 5.9 
 
100.0 99.0 67.0 5.8 17.6 3.6 53.3 78.7 41.2 91.7 5.2 
Afghanistan  15.6 37.0 50.0 6.0 
 
10.1 22.9 0.8 
 
0.4 0.7 
 India 3.2 66.3 33.0 91.0 125.0 13.4 12.0 8.7 49.5 58.7 41.1 84.2 25.1
Source: IMF GFS 2012, IMF WEO 2012, and World Bank Indicators 2012.  
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